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Hide-and-Seek in Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from Negative Corporate Incidents 
Purpose: This paper scrutinizes the legitimacy tactics employed in the annual reports of 
UK listed companies after their major corporate scandals. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: For a sample consisted of 19 companies that are 
indulged in corporate scandals, the content analysis approach was used to comprehend 
how corporate disclosure is used as an intermediary to rationalize corporate actions 
subsequent to corporate scandals.  
 
Findings: The findings reveal that firms use a wide range of legitimisation strategies in the 
manner that contribute to shape disclosure communications concerning negative incidents. 
We discovered that disclosure blur is used by the firms in times when there is an urge 
intended to create management by the firms for its stakeholders. For instance, some firms 
may offset the negativity linked to an incident by rendering such explanations amidst positive 
information.  
 
Originality/value: Contrary to earlier studies conducted on accounting scandals, we 
incorporated extensive corporate scandals such as human rights violations, controversies 
pertinent to child labour, environmental scandals, corruption, financial embezzlement, 
and tax evasion. 
 
1. Introduction 
This study investigates the legitimisation strategies used by companies during disclosure of 
negative information in their annual reports. Many studies have focussed on compliance of 
firms with codes of corporate governance (hereafter ‘CG’) practices (e.g. see Albu and 
Gîrbină, 2015; Nerantzidis and Tsamis, 2017; Lepore et al., 2018), as opposed to the quality 
or type of disclosures made by such firms. Thus, our study contributes to the disclosure 
research within CG literature. Accordingly, companies in several parts of the world are 
increasingly confronted with countess regulations and CG practices that obligate managers to 
declare disclosures regarding various activities of the firm. Accordingly, managers find 
themselves bewildered either to disclose certain information or retain it and at sometimes end 
up paying lip service to protect firm’s reputation (Laufer, 2006). 
Accordingly, such situations may occur where firms are deliberately engaged in unethical 
activities which may lead to severe consequences if unearthed, such as, annulment of 
operating licence, or imprisonment of managers. In some cases, firms may unintentionally 
commit acts that inflict adverse effects on its reputation and for its surrounding (Hahn, 2012). 
As an instance, BP suffered an accidental oil spill in 2010 which caused a large scale havoc 
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in the Gulf of Mexico (Lin-Hi and Blumberg, 2011). This caused damage to the ecosystem in 
the Gulf of Mexico, with an estimated 5000 barrels of oil spillage per day. Subsequently, the 
BP acknowledged the huge impact of this tragic event and undertook the responsibility to 
extricate the spillage. In addition to costly litigation, BP’s share prices plummeted due to the 
devastating environmental disaster (BBC, 2010; Lin-Hi and Blumberg, 2011). This is an 
instance of how such mishaps can cost a fortune to firms. On the other hand, Volkswagen had 
forged emissions testing for its vehicles by camouflaging them for low emission vehicles 
with the intention to attract multitude of customers. This was a deliberate action which 
resulted in severe erosion of the firm’s credibility by its stakeholders as well as lawsuits were 
instigated by its consumers and environmental campaigners. Other poor practices perpetrated 
by firms included tax avoidance and labour exploitation (for e.g. Dowling, 2014 and Lewis et 
al., 2015). According to Hahn (2012) when such catch the attention of firms’ stakeholders, 
the affected firms often respond by denying them, or covering their acts to minimise 
reputational damage, or admit the guilt with a pledge not to repeat it again.  
In addition to internal whistleblowing, country-level institutional factors and the media 
continue to play a key role in exposing negative incidents and scandals affecting firms 
globally (Petra, 2006; Adams et al., 2018; Ullah et al., 2018). Such exposures often incite 
regulatory scrutiny and public reactions resulting in abstention of firm’s products or service 
by customers (Dash, 2012). To overcome such risks, firms adopt various strategies to protect 
and/or repair their corporate reputation. Extant evidence suggests that firms use various 
legitimisation strategies to neutralise the consequences of a negative incidents or scandals 
which threaten their survival (Pollach, 2015; Li et al., 2016). In this paper, we analysed the 
strategies adopted by firms to dispel negative publicity corporate reputation followed by 
negative incidents and scandals. We performed content analysis of annual report disclosures 
provided by UK-based Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) that exhibit the common themes 
and strategies embraced by firms to rationalise incidents arising from accounting, social and 
environmental issues. By doing so, we unveiled strategies used by the firms to sustain 
legitimacy in the aftermath of big scandals and other negative incidents. This study elucidates 
insights into the responsive strategies adopted by firms for each category of incidents faced 
by individual firms, i.e. accounting, social and/or environmental issues. As this paper 
discovers, plenty firms provide voluntary disclosures concerning incidents which affect them 
(see also Elmagrhi et al., 2016). We also observed that most firms provide disclosures of 
such corporate incidents within their corporate social responsibility (hereafter ‘CSR’) 
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statements. Consistent with Martínez-Ferrero et al. (2016), we argue that the choice of CSR 
statements for disclosing corporate incidents is intended to boost stakeholder confidence in 
the affected firms as well as to safeguard firm reputation within the capital market. 
Finally, the findings obtained in this study contribute to literature by providing evidence 
concerning responses of UK-based MNEs to negative incidents. The paper espouses the 
approach used by Hahn and Lulfs (2014) in examining corporate disclosure strategies 
selected by US-based firms to legitimise negative events incidents. 
The organizational pattern of this paper follows a section that include discussion of literature 
review and theoretical framework underpinning this study, a further section that explicates 
research methodology, the section last section that elaborates the findings obtained in this 
paper and the last section discusses conclusion.  
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1 The Media and Political Costs 
Electronic and print media reports play a significant role in reducing information asymmetry 
through sharing information with stakeholders (Dash, 2012). The media can influence the 
information disclosed within firms’ annual reports. Firms thus include information within 
their annual reports to rebut or express regret for claims made by the media. Stakeholders and 
consumers would be averse to such negative media exposure. Han and Wang (1998) argue 
that firms tend to provide certain disclosures in order to minimise political costs. This ensures 
that firms are not exposed to any scrutiny or scandals. Lemon and Cahan (1997) examined 
the disclosure patterns of the firms operating in environmentally sensitive industries and 
found that such firms attracted more political attention than others, and also experienced 
political costs. The studies of Lemon and Cahan (1997) and Han and Wang (1998) 
subsequently concluded that political attention is correlated with increase in environmental 
disclosures. Also, Belkaoui and Karpik (1989) found that socially responsible companies 
show a positive social performance and are likely to disclose positive information in their 
annual reports. These two studies show that companies are more likely to disclose 
information if they are under pressure from the society or regulations. Moreover, firms are 
likely to include sensitive information to assure their stakeholders that they consider 
environment and their community under consideration and are conscious of future 
sustainability. 
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Literature suggests that companies are more likely to disclose positive information in which 
they demonstrate responsibility and have a positive public image in the eyes of the 
stakeholders (Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Lepore et al., 2018). Other empirical evidence shows that 
different social voluntary disclosure and value-added statements will be used in annual 
reports in order to reduce the information asymmetry between stakeholders and the 
companies’ management and to create a positive image for the companies (Ness and Mirza, 
1991; Panchapakesan and McKinnon, 1992; Deegan and Hallam, 1991; Lim and McKinnon, 
1993 and Deegan and Carroll, 1993). Even though the results for these empirical researches 
show a nexus between social responsibility and the amount of social disclosure in the annual 
reports, yet they identify that there is no necessary reason why the amount of disclosure 
should be related to the level of social spending (Milne, 2002). Notwithstanding, firms 
voluntarily provide information particularly where they deem their actions to be socially and 
environmentally acceptable (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). 
2.2 Disclosure Blur 
Chauvey et al. (2015) observed that the amount of disclosures provided within annual reports 
of firms continues to increase over time. This includes a variety of information concerning 
social and environmental factors related to firms. However, the writers questioned the utility 
of such information. They argue that its quality is poor owing to factors such as vague 
information often provided to conceal negative incidents or scandals and protect the firm’s 
legitimacy (Laufer, 2006; Chauvey et al., 2015). Nevertheless, a company’s legitimacy may 
be threatened after disclosure of negative incidents and events, and managers must therefore 
choose whether to disclose such information or to hide it from public. According to Bansal 
and Clelland (2004), companies disclosing negative information about themselves jeopardize 
their legitimacy particularly if the reported incidents contravenes society’s expectations. 
On the other hand, companies that fail to disclose negative incidents and scandals affecting 
them to stakeholders also risk losing their legitimacy often with negative repercussions in the 
event that information is revealed by the media or whistle-blowers (Heide and Våland, 2005; 
Dash, 2012; Reimsbach and Hahn, 2015). In light of these observations, the disclosure of 
negative scandals is a critical and sensitive issue and ought to be handled with due care by the 
firms (Janssen et al., 2015). Disclosure of negative information as well as failure to do so 
have the potential to tarnish a company’s legitimacy (Bitektine and Haack, 2015). Lundholm 
and Van Winkle (2006) argued that it is not the case whether the information will be revealed 
rather when it will be revealed. These writers further observed that although negative 
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incidents can cause conflicts between a company and society, yet the way such information is 
disclosed possess the potential to discard or control the impact of negative information. Not 
the least, Janney and Gove (2011) argued that any negative information emanating from third 
parties may suggest that the affected company is trying to hide some information from the 
public and thus risking severe damage to its legitimacy. 
Companies that have encountered negative incidents can still improve their image by 
disclosing the strategies they are using or intending to use so that the problem can be 
remedied (Hooghiemstra, 2000; Adams and Zutshi, 2004). This is also vital in ensuring that 
stakeholders’ perceptions are corrected (Hooghiemstra, 2000; Cormier and Gordon, 2001; 
Holder-Webb et al, 2009). However, existing evidence suggests that most firms prefer to 
make disclosures regarding positive issues (Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Milne et al, 2009; 
Khan et al., 2013). For instance, Deegan and Gordon (1996) observed that various companies 
disclose little negative information while prefer to disclose abundance of positive 
information. Instances of the positive disclosure observed within empirical literature include: 
voluntary adoption of environmental practices (for e.g. Mitra and Datta, 2014 and Zeng, 
2012), establishment of wildlife preservation areas (for e.g. see Harris, 2014 and Carruthers, 
2012) and energy saving measures (Mata et al., 2013; Pombo et al., 2016 and Nisiforou et al., 
2012). Conversely, the negative disclosure observed in the related literature incudes 
‘admission of causing environmental or health related problems’ (De Villiers and Alexander, 
2014), and ‘pollution and waste management challenges and investigations by authorities’ 
(Cormier and Magnan, 2015 and Matsumura et al., 2013). Nevertheless, Holder-Webb et al. 
(2009) while examining the disclosures of US firms under government investigation 
concluded that the disclosure quality is poor as information provided was vague, lacked depth 
and was less useful to stakeholders. This evidence suggests that some companies may reveal 
CSR disclosures merely as a way of paying lip service. 
The variety of approaches used by companies to restore or protect their legitimacy is well 
documented in literature. Some companies may deny the incident and shift the blame to the 
accidents, make claims that their actions are better than other companies or countering the 
accuser to reduce the accuser’s credibility (Suchman, 1995; Benoit, 1997). The present study 
argues that the effectiveness of such approaches in restoring a company’s reputation is likely 
to vary from approach to approach, company to company, or industry to industry. It is also 
possible that the type of approach adopted may be informed by the type and severity of the 
incident at hands. What is evident in literature is that, although various firms disclose both 
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positive and negative voluntary information, most disclosures contain mainly positive 
information (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003). 
Literature also shows that many companies prefer to attribute negative news to external 
factors instead of realizing their internal weaknesses. This observation is consistent with the 
findings of Yuthas et al. (2002) which suggests that firms with negative news tend to use 
fewer self-referral terms, such as, ‘we’ and ‘our’. This choice of the language can be 
interpreted as a strategy to attribute the negative information to externalities instead of the 
affected company. Some companies have been involved in using persuasive strategies to 
influence stakeh lders’ perceptions while reporting negative incidences, including narrating 
their past successes or associating it with parent company’s reputation (Higgins and Walker, 
2012). Other companies deem the disclosure of negative information as inconsequential 
(Hahn and Lülfs, 2014). In this context, companies adopt a series of language styles to 
manipulate stakeholders’ perceptions. This can include, but is not limited to, using vague and 
ambiguous phrases, numbers and statements (Hahn and Lülfs, 2014). 
In this paper, we investigate how UK companies make CSR disclosures particularly by 
focussing on how explanations regarding negative incidents and scandals are documented 
within CSR reports. 
2.3 Legitimacy Theory 
Gray et al. (1995) argue that undertaking voluntary disclosures not only enhance corporate 
transparency but also boost companies’ image in the eyes of their stakeholders. Consistent 
with the legitimacy theory’s assumption, stakeholders’ attitudes and perceptions about 
companies are significantly influenced by the information disclosed by each company. 
However, such disclosures may show how a company is dealing with positive or negative 
issues affecting it including societal and environmental pressures. Other disclosures may also 
be an acknowledgement of errors and mistakes that individual companies may have made 
including the plans how affected companies intend to overcome their mistakes to improve 
their public image. Accordingly, Suchman (1995) thus suggests that legitimacy is the 
perception concerning an entity’s actions compared with societal norms and values. 
Chan et al. (2014) argue that stakeholders and public in general can boycott the products of a 
company which is deemed to be engaged in illegitimate activities that contravene societal 
expectations. For this reason, firms are increasingly under pressure to provide disclosures 
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about sustainability, societal & environmental impact of their actions and not merely their 
financial performance. Such disclosures are intended to earn, maintain, or restore legitimacy 
and demonstrate social responsibility to stakeholders (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Deegan, 
2002; O’Donovan, 2002). Notwithstanding, some firms choose to provide extra disclosures 
than required by the existing regulations. As Branco and Rodrigues (2006) further contend, 
larger companies tend to attract more CSR scrutiny than smaller companies due to manifold 
regulations and involvement of several stakeholders. It therefore suggests that larger 
companies are likely to make more CSR disclosures than the small-sized firms, and their 
legitimacy in contrast to the smaller firms is in peril (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990 and Morsing 
and Shultz, 2006). 
To achieve legitimacy, Van Staden and Hooks (2007) argue that companies can use a reactive 
or proactive approach. The reactive approach occurs where companies provide explanations 
related to a recent event, crisis or scandal within their CSR statements. On the other hand, a 
proactive approach involves companies providing continuous disclosures about their 
activities and risks, both current and anticipated, as a way of protecting their legitimacy (Neu 
et al., 1998; Arvidsson, 2010; Nerantzidis and Tsamis, 2017). Companies may also provide 
CSR disclosures with an intention to manipulate stakeholders’ perceptions as opposed to 
merely being transparent. In addition, evidence suggests that some disclosures regarding 
corporate social and environmental performance could sometimes be ambiguous or 
inadequate (Archel et al., 2009). 
3. Methodology 
The sample of this study is composed of nineteen companies which are associated with the 
United Kingdom either through the sale of products or owe subsidiaries that operate in the 
United Kingdom. The data collection involved collecting generic and specific keywords from 
the firms’ annual reports (i.e. CG statements and CSR reports). The collected date was then 
sorted into one of eight legitimisation strategies, i.e.: (i) marginalisation, (ii) abstraction, (iii) 
indicating facts, (iv) institutional rationalisation, (v) theoretical rationalisation, (vi) 
authorisation, (vii) corrective action type 1 and (viii) corrective action type 2.                              
Table 1 presents the definitions of these categories. 
[Insert table 1 here] 
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We utilised an interpretivist philosophical standpoint in addressing the research problem 
pursued in the present study (see e.g. Othman and Rahman 2014; Atkins and Maroun 2015; 
Nakpodia et al. 2016). This method of inquiry permitted authors to carry out content analysis 
of annual report information with a view to identify legitimisation strategies used by 
companies following occurrence of negative incidents or scandals. Moreover, an interpretivist 
stance was favoured owing to its flexibility (Stake, 2005; Saunders, 2015), allowing authors 
to use judgement in identifying and constructing common themes about strategies used by 
firms to explain the occurrence of accounting, environmental and social issues. After reading 
the information contained in each annual report, i.e., CG statement and CSR report, the 
authors utilised inductive approach to discern similarities in disclosure statements intended to 
repair firm reputation and legitimacy. 
Content analysis was carried out by searching keywords related to negative incidents or 
scandals followed by categorization of each such statements. Examples of keywords 
identified included: “incident”, “accident”, “harm”, “risk”, “conflict”, “negative”, “human 
rights”, “environment”, “scandal”, “corruption”, “bribery”, “tax avoidance”, “child labour”, 
and “discrimination”. Similar keywords were merged to create common themes. Each 
incident or scandal (captured by the keywords) were juxtaposed with the legitimisation 
strategy published in the annual report explanation (See Table 2 for a full list of keywords 
used). 
[Insert table 2 here] 
The qualitative content analysis employed in this study followed the procedure recommended 
by Bos and Tarnai (1999). The first step commenced at a theoretical level where the research 
problem and research questions were identified upon reviewing literature. The next step 
involved establishment of the ‘study sample’ and ‘unit of analysis’, In the subsequence step, 
the themes identified to determine the validity and reliability of the data and the potential 
findings were pretested. The last procedure involved interpretation of results. 
Content analysis can also lead to some challenges that have been considered in this study. 
Steenkamp and Northcott (2007) and Graneheim et al. (2017) identified some challenges that 
need to be addressed. First, the choice of unit of analysis; the difficulty to determine where to 
analyse a sentence or a paragraph. The paragraph gives the reader an accurate context and 
interpretation of the voluntary disclosure. However, due to the nature of this study, it would 
be more beneficial to analyse sentences. The reason being that the keywords would need to 
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be identified in order to capture the addressing of the problem and the strategy used to repair 
their legitimacy. Another challenge can be the repetition of units- the use of the same 
keywords, phrases or themes. This creates difficulty as to how many times the same 
keywords or phrases are used throughout the text. This would be treated accordingly with the 
analysis of sentences; each sentence would be a different unit to analyse. Therefore, each 
repetitive message should be treated as a new piece of data. Holsti (1969) also identified that 
the use of repetitive text depends on the size of the context unit. However, it is still 
acknowledged that it is difficult to judge whether repetition should be included if they are in 
close proximity to each other (See e.g. Song et al. 2018). Steenkamp and Northcott (2007) 
identify substantive judgements as a practical challenge when using content analysis. 
Krippendorff (2004) and Stanton and Stanton (2002) expounds that while using content 
analysis, the text isn’t confined to a single meaning rather it is further owed to the reader’s 
judgement. Therefore, the interpretation of the text become strenuous to determine. Other 
possible meanings should be considered when analysing each disclosure on the grounds that 
every reader would not interpret each sentence in similar way. 
The data was collected from annual report information released by each individual company 
considered in this study. This enabled the authors to understand how various companies 
acknowledge incidents and scandals that affect them. We were also able to perceive how 
companies make voluntary disclosures including intents of legitimising strategies. The 
legitimising strategies have been studied following the approach utilised in earlier studies (for 
e.g. see Hahn and Lulfs, 2014; Talbot and Boiral, 2015; Castelló et al., 2016; and Hyndman 
and Liguori, 2016).  
The analysed companies have been selected for analysis on the basis of the scandals or 
incident that fitted well into one of the three categories: social, environmental or accounting. 
Furthermore, only those companies were selected for analysis that had experienced negative 
or scandalous incidents. The operations of the companies must also have been based in the 
UK; selling their products; subsidiary or their head office. These companies were also 
selected on the rationale regarding the nature of the incident or the scandal as well as the year 
in which the incident incurred (See Table 3). 
[Insert table 3 here] 
A summary of the key findings is presented in the results section. 
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4. Results 
This section provides a detailed discussion of the results acquired in this study. The analysis 
of the data resulted in the identification of seven common themes associated with the 
legitimisation strategies adopted by the UK firms during the provision of disclosures linked 
to negative incidents and scandals affecting them. Table 4 illustrates an overview of the 
coding scheme regarding how different explanations in response to corporate scandals were 
coded using reported text from the corporate documents (annual reports).  
     [Insert table 4 here] 
Table 4 depicts a summary of legitimation strategies used for the different categories of 
scandals. As evident from the descriptive analysis, non-compliant companies have employed 
a profusion of justifications and plenitude of legitimation strategies that include stipulated 
facts and assurance of taking remedial measures against non-compliance.  
[Insert table 5 here] 
In terms of reliability of the coding scheme, we asked two coders to independently code five 
relevant annual reports using our categorisation scheme. We then compared the degree of 
agreements between the two coders using the Cohen’s Kappa test of agreement. The purpose 
of this test is to determine whether independent coders will also code a category of 
explanation (disclosure) in similar manner as coded by the researchers (Krippendorff 2004). 
The Cohen Kappa test yielded a similarity statistic of 72% which confirms the validity of our 
coding scheme.  
In the following sub sections, we have provided a critical account of the tactics used in the 
corporate disclosure. 
4.1 Marginalisation 
This legitimisation strategy is used where companies intend to declare an incident as 
‘insignificant’, or less detrimental to itself and others as ‘affected’ (Talbot and Boiral 2015). 
For instance, one company provided the following explanation in the backwash of an 
incident: “While no significant community incidents occurred at our operated sites, we deeply 
regret the significant community impacts of the dam failure at our non-operated joint 
venture, Samarco” (BHP Billiton, 2016: 37). Such explanation illustrates an attempted 
legitimisation strategy where the company attempts to downplay the incident in question. In 
addition, only the description of the incident is provided in the disclosure statement. By doing 
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so, affected companies deliberately choose not to mention the nature of their operations 
within the disclosure narrative. This way, companies isolate the disclosed incidents from their 
own operations in an endeavour to portray the incident as negligible. However, such 
treatment of negative incidents as peripheral issues can affect the ability of stakeholders to 
make effective decisions and judgement regarding the matter at hand; that is, negative 
incidents and scandals affecting a company. Conversely, one may argue that a company’s 
managers would have extracted time to assess the impact of every incident on the firm’s 
operations before making any disclosures (Idowu et al. 2017). Nevertheless, stakeholders are 
denied an opportunity to carry out their own evaluation of incidents associated with a 
company particularly so when companies provide little explanation about an incident or how 
it affects the operations of a firm. 
4.2 Abstraction 
The data analysed also show th t firms employ an abstraction strategy to legitimise negative 
incidents. This strategy is found where companies generalise a negative incident to 
demonstrate as if an incident has affected many companies besides the company in question 
(Castelló et al. 2016). Such explanations also tend to be very equivocal in nature. An example 
of such disclosure is illustrated in the following statement:  
“Many transactions that occur during the ordinary course of business for which the ultimate 
tax determination is uncertain” (Amazon, 2014:21).  
This example shows obscure phrases and vocabulary such as ‘many transactions’ and 
‘ordinary course of businesses. This suggests that the incident could have occurred to any 
company. Another disclosure statement analysed for the purposes of this study read as below: 
“The healthcare sector is highly competitive and subject to regulation. This increases the 
instances where we are exposed to activities and interactions with bribery and corruption 
risk.” (GSK, 2014: 43).  
Our analysis ascertains that companies may attempt to provide disclosure statements 
generalised to the wider industry or the sector in which the company operates so as to depict 
an incident as a collective problem rather than company specific. Companies may particularly 
attempt to do so if they are unable to solve a problem, or where managers want to shift blame 
from themselves to other external factors by portraying it as industry challenge. This 
legitimacy tactic (abstraction) is intended to make stakeholders believe that the problem 
didn’t emerge due to the company’s performance (e.g. see Ayertey and Asrat, 2017) 
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4.3 Indicating Facts 
This legitimising strategy involves a company to simply disclose a negative incident which 
has occurred without going into details to provide an evaluation of how the incident impacts 
its activities (Talbot and Boiral 2015). Examples of such disclosure statements include: “The 
tragic accident in the Gulf of Mexico on 20 April 2010 cost 11 lives, leading to a major oil 
spill and a widespread loss of trust in BP” (BP, 2010: 2). Such statements may even involve 
measurement of some aspects of the incident but fail to provide detailed explanation or 
account to stakeholders about costs or causes of the incident. The following statement is 
another example illustrating how companies disclose negative incidents, in line with 
“indicating facts” strategy:  
“The ﬁre burned for 36 hours before the rig sank, and hydrocarbons leaked into the Gulf of 
Mexico for 87 days before the well was closed and sealed” (BP, 2010: 7).  
The problem with this disclosure approach is that it doesn’t allow stakeholders to 
comprehend the implications of disclosed incidents on firm performance or reputation. Such 
indicating facts may require comparison with past incidents or predefined benchmarks in 
order to understand their impact on firm activities and legitimacy. Thus, companies may 
employ the use of enumeration to protect their legitimacy. The less keen stakeholders may 
perceive such disclosures as an unbiased and accurate description of incidents without 
realising that they lack vital details necessary to interpret the figures provided. 
4.4 Rationalisation 
Instrumental rationalisation provides justification after occurrence of a negative incident. 
This strategy involves companies highlighting benefits accrued at the same time an incident 
occurred (Hyndman and Liguori, 2016). Companies utilising the rationalisation strategy in 
making negative disclosures have been observed to use terms such as ‘due to’ or ‘caused by’ 
in an attempt to neutralise the adverse news and portray the company favourably (Hahn and 
Lülfs, 2014). In addition, companies may employ a theoretical rationalisation strategy 
whereby negative incidents are justified by portraying them as standard behaviour. As an 
instance, our analysis divulged the following use of theoretical rationalisation in some 
companies’ disclosure statements:  
“We are exposed to bribery and corruption risk through our global business operations.” 
(GSK, 2014: 43); and, “We are subject to income taxes in the U.S. (federal and state) and 
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numerous foreign jurisdictions. Tax laws, regulations, and administrative practices in 
various jurisdictions may be subject to significant change due to economic, political, and 
other conditions, and significant judgment is required in evaluating and estimating our 
provision and accruals for these taxes” (Amazon, 2014: 20).  
Such statements, as our analysis reveal, are intended to make stakeholders believe that the 
reported incidents are inevitable during the company’s operations. In the case of two earlier 
cited examples, the disclosure statements appear to suggest that the companies are 
particularly susceptible to negative incidents due to their large operations diffusion across the 
globe. This legitimisation strategy implies that the companies have no mechanism to counter 
the risk of these negative incidents and is left to deal with them as they erupt.  
4.5 Authorisation 
This legitimisation strategy uses the names of governing bodies or authority when detailing, 
explaining or justifying a negative incident. It can also include citing an individual in a 
position of authority within or outside the company such as the CEO, director of the 
company, or officials of regulatory bodies (Hahn and Lülfs, 2014). An example of a 
disclosure statement employing authorisation strategy to safeguard its legitimacy, includes: 
“We partnered with Conservation International, a global environmental non-profit 
organisation, to develop Responsible Sourcing Guidelines (RSGs)” (Nestlé, 2012: 129). This 
disclosure statement shows that the company ‘Nestle’ has been proactively working together 
with a leading environmental conservation body to resolve a negative environmental incident. 
Such statement also gives credence to Nestle’s environmental practices. Our analysis finds 
that the decision of a company to associate itself with an authoritative/respected organisation 
in articulating news about a negative incident or scandal helps to safeguards its legitimacy. 
This may also include disclosures of a company’s collaboration with a respected third-party 
in finding a solution to the incident. 
4.6 Corrective Action 
Our analysis further found that some firms employ corrective action approach in providing 
disclosures concerning negative incidents. According to this strategy, firms not only provide 
details about a negative incident affecting them but move further to explain the steps 
undertaken to resolve those conundrums. We identified two forms of corrective action 
strategies utilised by the firms analysed, i.e., corrective action type I, and, corrective action 
type II. The corrective action type I involves explanation concerning how the disclosed 
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incident was resolved or the measures initiated to deter such incidents from occurrence in 
future. Nevertheless, our analysis finds that some companies disclosure statements include 
abstruse or generic explanations of procedures taken to repel a negative incident; i.e. “We are 
committed to continuously enhancing the safety and risk management of our operations and 
we will continue to do so in the wake of this tragedy” (BHP Billiton, 2016: 5), and, “Final 
restoration plans will be developed when the injury assessments are complete” (BP, 2010: 
12). These statements demonstrate that some measures will be executed to resolve and 
prevent the future occurrence of the problems cited. However, no precise or detailed 
procedures that shall be followed has been provided. As an instance, the two disclosure 
excerpts above failed to explain the actual ‘enhancements’ or ‘restoration plans’ respectively 
that will be implemented. This method of disclosure however provides some legitimacy on 
part of the company by implying that the company has already taken steps to address the 
problem. Corrective action type II, on the other hand, is a legitimisation strategy where a 
disclosure statement indicates the precise steps taken to resolve an incident as well as 
preventive measures to safeguard similar incidents in future. An example of a corrective 
action type II is as follows:  
“In the 1.6 l TDI engines, a “flow transformer” will be fitted in front of the air mass sensor to 
improve the sensor’s measuring accuracy. Combined with updated software, this will 
optimize the amount of diesel injected” (Volkswagen, 2015).  
In this example, the company – Volkswagen – clearly outlines the measures that it has 
developed to rectify the emissions level of its cars fitted with 1.6 l TDI diesel engines. This 
includes details of the component to be installed to eliminate the emission problem along 
with precise location where it will be fitted. This strategy towards disclosure helps 
stakeholders to understand how a company deals with challenging incidents, and 
subsequently enhances firm legitimacy. 
5. Discussion of results 
 
The six legitimation strategies discussed in the preceding section were found to emerge from 
incidents that fall into three categories: social, environmental and accounting-based issues. 
Our analysis further found consistency between each category of incident and legitimisation 
strategy commonly adopted by firms. We found most firms with social incidents to use 
corrective action type II legitimisation strategy. This legitimisation strategy is also the most 
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popular relative to corrective action (type I) (as our results are aligned with the studies; for 
e.g. Borghei et al. 2016; and Islam et al. 2016). We also found no evidence of firms using 
other legitimisation strategies when dealing with social incidents besides corrective action 
approach. This may be interpreted to suggest that the other strategies might lack the same 
legitimation effect when firms are dealing with social incidents. Companies may also prefer 
to use corrective action strategy to demonstrate their commitment to stakeholders in resolving 
social problems caused. However, companies utilising corrective action type I strategy can be 
argued to provide imprecise and/or undetailed information about incidents affecting them. 
This may be an elaborate strategy intended to detract attention from an incident and 
subsequently protecting legitimacy of such firms. 
Further, our results show that most firms with negative environmental incidents tend to 
employ correction action type II legitimising strategy, followed by type I. However, the data 
examined also showed some disclosure statements which indicating facts and authorisation 
strategies respectively. Moreover, some disclosure statements pertaining to environmental 
incidents were found to exhibit more than one legitimisation strategy. We argue that such a 
multi-faceted approach towards disclosure may be intended to prevent loss of firm 
legitimacy, particularly where an incident has a potential long-term danger to a firm. In that 
case, the use of facts indicates an acknowledgement of the incident by the affected firm while 
association with authorities may endorse the steps taken by a firm. This evidence means that 
environmental incidents are seriously considered in the UK. Thus, the firms that encounter 
negative environmental incidents are likely to experience a very high risk of losing their 
legitimacy. This might explain the diverse legitimisation strategies adopted by firms which 
encounter environmental incidents. 
Finally, our analysis showed that firms with incidents that are accounting in nature prefer to 
employ corrective action type II and I strategies followed by indicating facts in that order. We 
attribute this preference of legitimisation strategies to the fact that accounting is a domain that 
is heavily regulated compared to the other two areas – social and environmental matters. This 
means that the firms which encounter accounting incidents will want to provide reassurance 
to their stakeholders and will alleviate any uncertainties concerning firms’ relationship with 
regulators. By doing so, firms also ensure that their annual report information and other 
communications are taken seriously by their stakeholders. We therefore ague that it is for this 
reason that the firms are observed to acknowledge accounting incidents and disclose such 
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information to stakeholders as well as actions taken or considered to resolve them. This way, 
firms can regain their legitimacy. 
6. Conclusion, limitations and avenue for future research 
This study enhances our understanding of the legitimisation strategies utilised by the UK 
firms after the occurrence of negative incidents and scandals which are of social, 
environmental or accounting nature. This follows from observation that firms are integrating 
comprehensive CSR statements within their annual reports as a way of shielding corporate 
legitimacy (Laufer, 2006; Elmagrhi et al., 2016). Many companies also use their CSR reports 
to address sensitive events and problems which affect them. Negative incidents usually attract 
negative media coverage and subsequently firms are under immense scrutiny from 
stakeholders (Dash, 2012). Companies thus always respond to media reports about incidents 
affecting them. They do this to limit or alleviate damage to their corporate legitimacy. 
Accordingly, the present study investigated how listed UK firms disclose and/or explain 
negative incidents affecting them. 
Our findings show that firms use a range of legitimisation strategies in the way they build 
corporate communications concerning negative incidents as well as well the amount of 
information provided. The study finds that firms use disclosure blur where they provide 
information that is intended to create impression management on their stakeholders. For 
instance, some firms may offset the negativity related to an incident by placing such 
explanations amidst positive information. Following the approach of Hahn and Lülfs (2014), 
we identified eight legitimisation strategies that have been used by UK firms in disclosing 
negative information as follows: marginalisation, abstraction, indicating facts, instrumental 
rationalisation, theoretical rationalisation, authorisation, corrective action type I and 
corrective action type II. 
Following a content analysis technique, our analysis show that seven out of the eight 
legitimisation strategies hypothesised by Hahn and Lülfs (2014) have been used at least once, 
apart from instrumental rationalisation. The results show that social incidents involve a high 
amount of type I and type II corrective actions. Therefore, information on the incident may be 
vague, however, the companies would provide extensive details on the resolution and future 
prevention of similar incidents. Many firms also adopt corrective action types I and II in 
dealing with incidents of environmental nature. Not least, indicating facts and authorisation 
also appear to be used in moderate frequency in dealing with environmental incidents. We 
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conclude that these two additional legitimisation strategies are potentially used to validate 
firms’ post-incident actions through association with external parties. We also find that the 
category of incident – social, environmental or accounting, matters for the type of 
legitimisation strategy selected. 
The present study utilised a relatively small sample size of nineteen companies. Future 
comparative studies may consider employing a larger sample size from different corporate 
governance systems to substantiate whether the findings are robust to different institutions 
environment. We find no evidence of UK companies using legitimisation strategies such as: 
‘complete denial or use of positive statements’ that veil negative incidents. Future studies 
may also extend this research in other countries such as those in the European Union, to 
ascertain whether the legitimisation strategies found in this study also exist in such countries. 
Another possible avenue for research is to carry out multi-country analysis to determine the 
extent of similarities or differences in legitimisation strategies used by the firms in various 
jurisdictions. 
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Table 1: Definition of different categories (legitimation strategies) 
Legitimisation strategy Description 
Marginalisation This relates to the voluntary disclosure suggesting that the negative incident or 
scandal was irrelevant or unimportant. This would try to suggest that it was only 
a minor or insignificant incident and should not be taken with such severity. 
Abstraction This relates to the generalisation of the incident, implying that it occurs 
throughout the whole industry sector and not just within the company. This 
suggests that the incident is not only the companies fault but is a typical industry 
wide occurrence. 
Indicating Facts This is the mention of accurate figures relating to the incident, which quantifies 
the existence of the negative incident. 
Instrumental 
rationalisation 
This mentions the positive aspects and outcomes of the incident to minimise its 
negative effect. 
Theoretical 
rationalisation 
This relates to the emphasis of inevitability and that the incident is of natural 
behaviour. 
Authorisation This emphasises the support of authorities or benchmarks to compare or 
legitimise their actions towards the incident. 
Corrective action type 
1 
This is the acknowledgement of the negative incident and the imprecise 
measures they carry out, through ideas, intent or the solution to rectify the 
incident. 
Corrective action type 
2 
This is the acknowledgement of the negative incident with exact and precise 
measures of correcting the incident. This gives no ambiguity with exact details of 
the event. 
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Table 2: Keywords applied in the content analysis 
Generic Keywords Specific Keywords 
Incident Underage 
Accident Loss 
Harm Launder 
Risk Spill 
Conflict Deepwater horizon 
Negative Privacy 
Human rights Battery 
Environment Reserve 
Scandal Overstate 
Corruption Restatement 
Bribery Employees 
Tax (Avoidance) Deforestation 
Child labour (Labour) Animals 
Discrimination Wildlife 
Issue 
Accountable 
Action 
Response 
Failure   
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Table 3: Types of controversies 
Company Name Industry Year of Incident Incident 
Amazon Online Retailing 2014 Tax Avoidance 
Apple Technology 2010 Child Labour 
BHP Billiton Mining 2015 Dam collapsed & indigenous 
community displaced 
BP Oil and gas 2010 Oil Spill 
GSK Pharmaceutical 2014 Corruption in China 
H&M Clothing retailer 2010 Factory Fire  
Child labour 
HSBC Bank 2013 Money Laundering 
Nestlé Food 2012 Child Labour  
Deforestation for Palm Oil 
Nokia Technology 2009 Selling Spying Equipment to 
Iran (violation of UN 
Resolution) 
Npower Energy 2013 Tax Avoidance 
Olympus Electronics 2011 Fraud  
Samsung Technology 2016 Battery Burnout on Samsung 
Galaxy Note 7 Phones 
Shell Oil and Gas 2004 Fraud – Overstated Reserves 
Siemens Engineering and 
manufacturing 
2008 Corruption 
Sports Direct Sports retailer 2015 Human Rights in the Workplace 
Tesco Grocery and 
retailer 
2015 Overstated Profits 
Toshiba Technology 2015 Overstate Operating Profits 
Volkswagen Automobiles 2015 Emissions rigging scandal 
Zara Clothing Retailer 2013 Child Labour 
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Table 4: Coding Scheme 
Company Name Scandal Category Year Text from the Annual Report Legitimisation Strategy 
H&M Social 2010 
“Today, incidents of children working in our first-tier supply chain 
occur rarely” (H&M, 2010: 103) 
Marginalisation 
Npower Accounting 2012 
 
“Taxation is a complex part of any business’s operation” (RWE 
Npower, 2013: 12) 
Abstraction 
Samsung Environmental 2017 
 
“More than 200,000 devices and 30,000 batteries underwent 
testing” (Samsung Electronics, 2017: 42) 
Indicating Facts 
GSK Accounting 2014 
 
“We are exposed to bribery and corruption risk through our global 
business operations.” (GSK, 2014: 43) 
Theoretical rationalisation 
Tesco Accounting 2015 
 
“This is now the subject of an investigation by the Serious Fraud 
Office and civil proceedings in the United States.” (Tesco PLC, 
2015: 12) 
Authorisation 
HSBC Money Laundering 2013 
 
“The Board approved and adopted revised Global Sanctions and 
Global Anti-Money Laundering Programme Policies, to facilitate 
implementation and assurance of globally consistent practices” 
(HSBC Holdings PLC, 2013: 329) 
Corrective action type 1 
Siemens Accounting 2008 
 
“Since 2007, we have trained well over 200,000 employees in 
compliance matters.” (Siemens, 2008: 65) 
Corrective action type 2 
Page 28 of 29Corporate Governance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Corporate Governance
29 
 
Table 5: Summary of legitimation strategies for all scandals 
Strategy Accounting Social Environmental 
Number of Marginalisation occurrences 2 1 2 
Abstraction  6 0 3 
Indicating facts  21 5 15 
Instrumental rationalisation  0 0 0 
Theoretical rationalisation  2 2 0 
Authorisation  6 1 12 
Corrective action type 1  23 10 18 
Corrective action type 2  27 19 25 
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